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Brown v. McDaniel. 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 60 (Aug. 7, 2014)1 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: POST-CONVICTION HABEAS RELIEF 
 
Summary 
  
The Court determined whether the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may 
constitute good cause under NRS 34.726(1) and NRS 34.810 to allow a noncapital petitioner to 
file an untimely and successive post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
Disposition 
  
The Court held that the United States Supreme Court Decision in Martinez v. Ryan2 does 
not alter its prior decisions that a petitioner has no constitutional right to post-conviction counsel 
and such counsel’s ineffectiveness does not constitute good cause to overcome the procedural 
bars under NRS 34.726(1) or NRS 34.810 unless the appointment was mandated by statute. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
  
Brown was convicted of first-degree murder and was sentenced to prison. The Nevada 
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in January 2006 and the remittitur was issued on 
February 7, 2006. Subsequently, Brown filed a timely post-conviction petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. The appeal was denied on its merits and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed said 
denial in August 2009. 
 Brown filed a second post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 10, 2010 
alleging claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The district court 
dismissed the petition, as it was untimely and successive. Brown appealed this decision. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Brown’s argument relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez. 
 
The applicable procedural bars 
 
 The court first examined Nevada’s statutory post-conviction scheme. NRS 34.726(1) sets 
the procedural time limits for which a post-conviction petition must be filed.3 NRS 34.810(1)(b) 
allows for the dismissal of a post-conviction petition when the claims contained therein could 
have been raised earlier.4 NRS 34.810(2) provides for the dismissal of a second or successive 
petition.5  
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 In order to overcome these procedural bars, the petitioner must demonstrate “good cause” 
for the default and actual prejudice.6 To show good cause, the petitioner must demonstrate that 
an “impediment external to the defense” prevented him from complying with the procedural 
rules.7 
 Next, the Court applied these rules to the present case. First, Brown’s second petition was 
filed more than four years after the issuance of remittitur from the direct appeal of the judgment 
of conviction. Second, the claims raised in the second petition were or could have been raised in 
his first petition. Finally, Brown could not show good cause to overcome the successive and 
untimely nature of his petition because the Court has consistently held that the ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel in a noncapital case cannot constitute “good cause.”8 This 
is true because there is no constitutional or statutory right to the assistance of counsel in 
noncapital post-conviction proceedings. 
 
Martinez v. Ryan does not address state procedural bars 
 
 Right off the bat, the Court disagreed that Martinez changed the Court’s jurisprudence 
regarding what can constitute good cause. The Court then went on to discuss the underlying facts 
of Martinez. There, the petitioner argued that he had good cause for the procedural default 
because counsel in his first state collateral proceeding was ineffective for failing to raise the 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims in that proceeding.9 
 The Supreme Court in Martinez thus considered “whether ineffective assistance in an 
initial-review collateral proceeding on a claim of ineffective assistance at trial may provide cause 
for a procedural default in a federal habeas proceeding.”10 The Supreme Court answered this 
question in the affirmative where state law provides that ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 
claims must be raised in a collateral proceeding. 11  However, the Supreme Court expressly 
declined to decide whether a federal constitutional right to counsel exists in post-conviction 
proceedings and instead emphasized that its ruling was equitable in nature rather than 
constitutional.12 
 The Court also provided two reasons why Martinez does not alter its decisions in 
McKague and Crump. First, Martinez did not announce a constitutional right to counsel in post-
conviction proceedings. Second, the Martinez decision is limited to the application of the 
procedural default doctrine that guides a federal habeas court’s review of the constitutionality of 
a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence.13 Moreover, the Martinez decision says nothing about 
the application of state procedural default rules.14 
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 Despite these reasons, Brown urged the Court to adopt the rationale from Martinez even 
if Martinez does not require it to do so. However, the Court declined to accept Brown’s 
invitation to adopt an equitable exception to the general rule in Nevada that the ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel does not establish good cause to overcome the state 
procedural bars. The Court’s reasoned that the exception pressed by Brown is contrary to the 
statutory language in NRS Chapter 34 and the clear legislative intent behind those statutes. These 
statutes only contemplated one post-conviction petition to challenge a conviction or sentence. 
The legislative history of these statutes also reflect the intent that only one petition may be 
brought.15  
 If the Court were to adapt Brown’s rule, it would circumvent the Legislature’s “one time 
through the system” intent because each petitioner could have an opportunity to litigate a second 
petition based on the petitioner’s first post-conviction counsel. The finality of the judgment of 
conviction would be extremely undermined and the resources of the courts would be stretched 
even thinner than they already are. Avoiding these issues was precisely the intent of the 
Legislature when it created NRS Chapter 34.16 
 The Court then discussed how it would be difficult for it to follow one part of Martinez 
without the other17 as both parts of the holding are based on the same idea — that “a prisoner 
likely needs an effective attorney” in order “[t]o present a claim of ineffective assistance at trial 
in accordance with the State’s procedures.”18 Applying the failure-to-appoint counsel part of 
Martinez would effectively eliminate the mandatory procedural default provisions of NRS 
Chapter 34 because the only way to maintain the integrity of those provisions would be to 
appoint counsel in all initial-review post-conviction proceedings. 
 Furthermore, the Court rejected Brown’s suggestion that it adopt an exception similar to 
that adopted in Martinez because the Legislature intended that the state habeas remedy be 
“coextensive” with the federal habeas remedy and exceptions to federal procedural bars. The 
Court explained that the federal doctrine of procedural default utilized by federal courts is based 
in principles of comity. Rather, Nevada’s statutory procedural bars are designed to ensure the 
finality of judgments of conviction and streamline the post-conviction review process. Thus, the 
state procedural bars “exist to implement policies independent from those animating the [federal 
doctrine of procedural default].”19 
 The Court also explained that while it has looked to the Supreme Court for guidance, it 
has not followed Supreme Court decisions when they are inconsistent with state law. 20 
Therefore, the Court is not bound by the Supreme Courts decisions when interpreting “cause 
exceptions under NRS 34.726 and 34.810. Accordingly, the Court declined to extend the rule 
from Martinez to state post-conviction proceedings. Rather, the Court found that adoption of 
such a rule lies in the hands of the Legislature. 
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Actual innocence 
 
 The Court dismissed Brown’s argument of actual innocence due to his failure to identify 
any new evidence of his innocence. Rather, Brown’s argument continued to rely on his legal 
claims that there was insufficient evidence of first-degree murder presented at his trial and that 
his trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective. 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court found that Brown’s petition was untimely and successive and that he failed to 
demonstrate good cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural bars contained in NRS 34.726 
and NRS 34.810. Thus, Brown was not entitled to relief from his appeal. 
 
 
